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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Marcos Apollo Jimenez appeals from the sentence imposed upon his guilty
plea to sexual battery of a child sixteen or seventeen years of age.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In 2013, Jimenez was involved in a dating relationship with the mother of
seventeen-year old C.K. (PSI, pp.3, 87-90) C.K. has a learning disability, anxiety
issues, and the mental capacity of a younger child. (Id.) In September 2013, C.K.
reported to police that Jimenez took her clothes out of the bathroom while she was
taking a shower. (Id.) Jimenez told C.K. that he wanted to show her something and
brought her into the bedroom. (Id.) There, Jimenez penetrated C.K.'s vagina with
his fingers. (Id.) Later, when C.K. tried to retrieve her clothes, Jimenez put her on a
bed, and penetrated her vagina with his penis. (Id.) After C.K. shoved at him and
told him to stop, Jimenez got up from the bed and apologized. (Id.) A sexual assault
exam revealed injuries consistent with C.K. 's statements to police. (PSI, pp.3, 91104.)
The state charged Jimenez with rape and sexual battery of a minor 16 or 17
years of age. (R., pp.35-36.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Jimenez pied guilty to

the sexual battery charge, and the state dismissed the rape charge. (2/3/14 Tr., p.4,
L.11 - p.24, L.24.) There was no agreement as to sentencing recommendations. (Id.)
Prior to sentencing, Jimenez declined to participate in a psychosexual evaluation.
(4/7/14 Tr., p.4, L.17 - p.10, L.22.)

The district court imposed a unified 18-year
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sentence with three years fixed.

(R., pp.66-69.)

pp.77-79.)
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Jimenez timely appealed.

(R.,

ISSUE

Jimenez states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err by using Mr. Jimenez's decision to
exercise his right not to participate in the psychosexual
evaluation against him at sentencing?
(Appellant's brief, p. 7.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Jimenez failed to meet his burden under the fundamental error doctrine
to demonstrate that the district court enhanced his sentence or otherwise punished
him for exercising his Fifth Amendment rights with regard to the psychosexual
evaluation?
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ARGUMENT
Jimenez Has Failed To Meet His Burden Under The Fundamental Error Doctrine To
Demonstrate That The District Court Enhanced His Sentence Or Otherwise
Punished Him For Exercising His Fifth Amendment Rights With Regard To The
Psychosexual Evaluation

A.

Introduction
For the first time on appeal, Jimenez contends that the district court erred by

using his decision not to participate in a psychosexual evaluation against him at
sentencing. (See generally Appellant's brief.) Jimenez's cannot show fundamental
error because a review of the record reveals that the district court did not enhance
Jimenez's sentence or otherwise penalize him for asserting his Fifth Amendment
rights with regard to the evaluation.

B.

Standard Of Review
"[C]onstitutional issues are pure questions of law over which this Court

exercises free review."

Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, _ , 321 P.3d 709, 714

(2014) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

However, "[i]t is a fundamental

tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must be made in the trial
court before an issue is preserved for appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398,
3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). The appellate courts of this state will only review
unpreserved assertions of error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry.
150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010).
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C.

The District Court Did Not Punish Jimenez For His Decision To Assert His
Fifth Amendment Rights
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment right against

self-incrimination applies to psychosexual evaluations that may be used by a district
court to support a harsher sentence. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 564, 149 P.3d
833, 839 (2006).

Therefore, a defendant may decline participation in a

psychosexual evaluation ordered by the district court, and the court may not use
such a decision against the defendant at sentencing. See id.
For the first time on appeal, Jimenez contends that the district court violated
his Fifth Amendment rights by using his decision not to participate in the
psychosexual evaluation against him in making its sentencing determination.
(Appellant's brief, pp.8-11.)

As Jimenez acknowledges (Appellant's brief, p.8),

because he failed to raise this issue below, he must demonstrate fundamental error.
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. To do so, Jimenez must demonstrate: (1)
a constitutional violation; (2) that the violation is clear and obvious without the need
for additional information not contained in the appellate record; and (3) that prejudice
resulted. ~ Jimenez cannot demonstrate fundamental error because he cannot
show from the record that the district court enhanced his sentence or otherwise
penalized him for asserting his Fifth Amendment rights with regard to the evaluation.
At the change of plea hearing, the court advised Jimenez of his Fifth
Amendment right to decline participation in the psychosexual evaluation, and of his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel regarding his decision whether to participate in the
evaluation. (2/3/14 Tr., p.18, L.11-p.19, L.6.) The court then continued:
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I do want you to know that the sentence that I give in this case will
largely be fashioned, at least in part, based upon the risks you pose
to society.
If you don't provide full information to the evaluator, then it makes it
difficult for the evaluator and for the Court to assess your risk of reoffending.
(2/3/14 Tr., p.19, Ls.3-11.)
Rather than indicate that it would penalize Jimenez should he choose not to
participate in the psychosexual evaluation, the district court informed Jimenez that
he might not necessarily benefit from such a decision and that, instead, the court's
ability to fashion a proper sentence may be limited if it did not have sufficient
information. The district court's decision to inform Jimenez of both the potential pros
and cons of declining participation in the evaluation did not constitute fundamental
error. Instead, the court's advisement ensured that Jimenez had the opportunity to
make an informed decision.
At the sentencing hearing, after it became aware that Jimenez had decided
not to participate in the psychosexual evaluation, the district court first endeavored to
make sure that this was Jimenez's final decision. (4/7/14 Tr., p.4, L.17 - p.7, L.24.)
The court gave Jimenez another opportunity to consult with his attorney. (4/7/14 Tr.,
p.7, Ls.17-24.) Jimenez did so and chose to stand by his decision not to participate
in the evaluation. (Id.)
The district court then made clear that while its sentencing determination
would be more difficult to make without the psychosexual evaluation, it would rely on
the information in the record. The court stated:
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And so that's the record before me, and I'll have to make my
decision based upon the information I have, not the information I
don't have.
And so one of the reasons we have a psychosexual
evaluation is so that the court can understand who you are and
what type of a person you are. If I don't have any information, then
I have to look at the facts of this case and pretty much nothing else,
or there is very little else in the record to help me make a decision
about what kind of a person you are. I just know what you've done
here, and that tells me what kind of person you are, unless there
are some other factors.
Now there might be reasons why you don't want me to know
your past, and if you don't want me know your past, then I can't
make you tell me; and the Constitution says you don't have to tell
me. But if I don't know your past, then I'm going to have to just
judge you by the type of man I know you are from the information
that's before me. Do you understand[?]
(4/7/14 Tr., p.9, Ls.3-23.)
After taking argument and sentencing recommendations from the parties, the
district court again reiterated that it was basing its sentence on the information
before it, and that the limited information in the record made its analysis more
difficult. (4/7/14 Tr., p.25, L.7 - p.34, L.22.) The court stated that it reviewed the
record "carefully," and that it considered the facts of the case, the presentence
investigation, the GAIN-I Core assessment, Jimenez's lack of a prior criminal record,
other aggravating and mitigating factors, and the appropriate statutory sentencing
criteria. (Id.)

At no point did the district court indicate that it was enhancing

Jimenez's sentence for declining to participate in the evaluation.
On appeal, Jimenez points to statements made by the court indicating that, in
the absence of a psychosexual evaluation, it would have "no reason not to assume"
that Jimenez was a high risk to re-offend. (Appellant's brief, p.10. (citing 4/7/14 Tr.,
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p.8, Ls.6-10).) However, even to the extent that the court made such assumptions,
they were reasonably based upon the record in front of it. As the court stated at the
sentencing hearing, the nature of the crime and Jimenez's thought process in
committing the crime "demonstrates an incredible amount of criminal thinking, which
in the absence of other reports, gives the court a significant amount of information
on which I can base my decision." (4n/14 Tr., p.33, Ls.17-20.) Therefore, these
"assumptions" do not demonstrate an unconstitutional sentencing enhancement or
constitute fundamental error - instead, they were simply conclusions that the district
court drew from the record that were not subject to mitigation from any psychosexual
evaluation.
Indeed, the existing record provided the district court significant information
from which to conclude that its concerns for the safety of the community, and any
related assumptions regarding the danger to the community posed by Jimenez, were
well-founded.

As the district court discussed (4/7/14 Tr., p.32, L.23 - p.34, L.9),

Jimenez utilized a position of trust to gain access to C.K., his girlfriend's daughter.
C.K. was a vulnerable victim - she had a learning disability, anxiety issues, and the
mental capacity and sexual naivete of a younger child, and Jimenez's crime had a
significant and continuing impact on her. (4n/14 Tr., p.25, Ls.14-19; p.34, Ls.10-17;
PSI, pp.3, 87-90.)
Additionally on appeal, Jimenez quotes from a portion of the sentencing
hearing which, Jimenez asserts, demonstrates that the district court assumed that
Jimenez declined participation in the psychosexual evaluation in order to hide
uncharged prior criminal conduct from the district court.
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(Appellant's brief, p.10

(citing 4ll/14 Tr., p.31, Ls.2-24).) However, as Jimenez acknowledges (Appellant's
brief, p.11 ), immediately following these comments, the district court expressly made
clear that any such assumptions "really played no factor" in its sentencing
determination. (4/7/14 Tr., p.31, Ls.21-24.) The court stated:
The court is very aware that you have no record. I'm not
sure what to make of that without a psychosexual evaluation or
polygraph. I could assume that that means that you've just never
broken the law in your entire life, or I could assume that you've
never been caught; sometimes it's somewhere in between. I do
note that some of the dangerous criminals are the ones that are
good enough to get away with it. But, again, I just don't have any
evidence there to give me confidence of what conclusions I should
draw from that. I can only assume, though, that the fact that you
didn't participate [in the psychosexual evaluation] must mean
there's some information you don't want me to know about. I
wouldn't hold that against you at trial, that would be wrong because
you have a right to remain silent at your trial and you do have a
right to remain silent here now, too. But generally if there is
something that you didn't want me to know, I can only assume
there is a good reason you didn't want me to know it. But again,
those things really played no factor in my sentence. I just have to
deal with the case as what it is, and not what it's not, and my
discussion is based on the information I do have.
(4/7/14 Tr., p.31, Ls.2-24 (emphasis added).)
Regardless of whether it was advisable for the district court to even discuss
the theoretical factual conclusions that could be drawn from Jimenez's decision not
to participate in the psychosexual evaluation, Jimenez cannot meet his burden of
demonstrating clear constitutional error as required by Perry and the fundamental
error doctrine. This is especially true where the district court expressed its
awareness of the relevant constitutional rights, and where it emphasized, more than
once, that it was basing its sentence on the information actually available to it in the
record.
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Finally, it is notable that the district court imposed a sentence that was in line
with what Jimenez himself recommended to the court. At the sentencing hearing,
Jimenez recommended a sentence of "somewhere in the vicinity of two to four
years," and then asked the court to "consider two years on this with a more
extensive probation." (4/7/14 Tr., p.23, Ls.1-4.) The state recommended a unified
25-year sentence with 10 years fixed. (4/7/14 Tr., p.21, Ls.22-25.) The district court
sided largely with Jimenez's recommendation and imposed a unified 18-year
sentence with three years fixed.

(R., pp.66-69.)

Jimenez cannot show that the

district court committed fundamental error by unconstitutionally enhancing his
sentence where the sentence imposed was similar to the one Jimenez himself
considered to be reasonable under the record actually available to the district court.
Jimenez has failed to meet his burden under the fundamental error doctrine to
demonstrate that the district court enhanced his sentence or otherwise penalized
him for his decision to exercise his Fifth Amendment rights with regard to the
psychosexual evaluation.

This Court should therefore affirm the district court's

sentence.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the sentence imposed
upon Jimenez's guilty plea to sexual battery of a child sixteen or seventeen years of
age.
DATED this 12th day of March, 2015.

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 12th day of March, 2015, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office.

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
MWO/pm
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